realizing I am a bit of a lightweight here but isn't it the case that naturalism posits that human "reasoning" is fundamentally nonrational in that it holds that all phenomena including human reasoning are artifacts of nature and arise from nonrational causes. Therefore as has been aknowledged by many naturalists there belief system ultimately holds they have no secure basis for holding there beliefs. At best a naturalist can hold that naturalism seems a pragmatic worldview never that it is a true worldview.

Rauser, you write:

You just illustrated that whlie belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties may remain a prgamatic and psychological necessity, given naturalism (but not theism) you have no RATIONAL reason to believe your cognitive faculties to be reliable.

Oy.

No, I didn't. I pointed out pragmatic reasons for starting from the default assumption that our cognitive faculties can be reliable. In the same way that pretty much must start from the assumptions that there's a real world out there, populated with other minds - postulating anything else is automatically self-defeating. And, in the two-part post below, I developed an entirely consitent, "RATIONAL", naturalistic argument for why this would be so. Nor have you really argued against it - there may be an infinite number of ways for something to be wrong and useful in some particular situation, but when you start adding in multiple situations, the wrong and useful beliefs start contradicting each other. Indeed, the smallest useful set of beliefs is the one that matches reality most closely - and as I noted, evolution must economize.

(I note that you completely ignored the point that, if our cognitive faculties were so well-designed, they should not be so easily derailed.)

I think Ethan Allen said it best over a century ago:

"Those who invalidate reason ought seriously to consider whether they argue against reason with or without reason; if with reason, then they establish the principle that they are laboring to dethrone, but if they argue without reason, (which, in order to be consistent with themselves, they must do) they are out of the reach of rational conviction, nor do they deserve a rational argument."

sorceror,

You just illustrated that whlie belief in the reliability of our cognitive faculties may remain a prgamatic and psychological necessity, given naturalism (but not theism) you have no RATIONAL reason to believe your cognitive faculties to be reliable. (In other words, you offer the "chicken little" defense: assume our faculties are reliable or the sky will fall.) Time to become a theist buddy.

Rauser - Not correct. All that is required is that the probability that our beliefs be on balance true is low or INSCRUTABLE. If we have no way of knowing whether our cognitive faculties are more likely truth-aimed then we have no basis to trust their reasoning (including your argument).

Nope. That's what the Woody Allen quote addressed. "Is knowledge knowable? If not, how do we know this?"

It's like the "brain in a vat" theory. If we assume it's true... then what? We're at a practical and philosophical dead end. The only practical thing to do is assume the converse, that we're experiencing some kind of real world, however imperfectly, until and unless we get evidence to the contrary.

In the same way, if you assume your reason is fundamentally faulty... then what? How could you even trust your conclusion that your reason is worthless? No, you have to assume that it's possible for your reason to reach true conclusions, or else you're stuck at a dead end.

Then, if we look for confirming evidence, we find... the case I just outlined.

Unconvinced,

An intellectually mature individual is one who contemplates that he or she could be wrong. Let's look at your questions.

1) Is the premise of these questions even _possible_? To what degree (more or less possible than, say, solipsism)? (I'm not saying likely, plausible, or even believable to you – just _possible_.) (If not, the other two questions are moot.)

What do you mean by possible? (I'm not being nit-picky here.) I don't believe it is logically possible because I believe that God exists in every possible world. But I also recognize that I could be wrong about that, as I could be wrong about other matters. In other words, either it is logically necessary that God exist, or it is logically impossible that God exist (by definition one of these two must obtain). Nobody has shown the latter to be true but for all I know it is possible that somebody could.

2) Is it possible that belief in god(s) is one of those not-true beliefs sorcerer described that was evolutionarily beneficial to man at an early stage of his evolution and that it has persisted to this day?

If there is no God, then sure. But it could be evolutionarily beneficial if there is a God as well.

3) If God truly does not exist, would you want to believe that? Or would you rather continue believing in a non-existent god? Why?

Would I want to believe what is true? Well, duh.

Sorceror,

"It's critical to the argument that it be more likely, or at least as likely, that a false belief will be at least as useful as a true one..."

Not correct. All that is required is that the probability that our beliefs be on balance true is low or INSCRUTABLE. If we have no way of knowing whether our cognitive faculties are more likely truth-aimed then we have no basis to trust their reasoning (including your argument).

"It's worth noting that the examples Plantinga comes up with are all overly complex and Rube-Goldberg-esqe...."

This is a very subjective point. Plantinga's examples (e.g. the prehistoric man who runs away from the saber-tooth tiger because he WANTS to be eaten) are intentionally fanciful but they are simply making the point that there are an infinite number of false beliefs in any given circumstance which are adaptive whereas there is only one true belief. Here's a simple one. I have the false belief that I am a great public speaker. As a result, my confidence is boosted and I end up giving a better speech than I would have if I had known that I am a poor public speaker. There are innumerable false beliefs like this that aid our flourishing and without a superintending agent you have NO WAY to know that your cognitive faculties are on balance truth seeking. As a result, skepticism follows.

Ennui,

"Either way I did not argue for naturalism and the only claim is that I do not believe in the Christian God and don't believe he talks to me."

But you listed atheism as among those beliefs which can be prima facie properly basic. I was explaining that it cannot be. Generally speaking, any belief system which posits a veridical and capable designer of human cognitive faculties allows for prima facie proper basicality. But as Plantinga points out, this is indeed PRIMA FACIE and not ULTIMA FACIE. Defeaters play an essential role in Plantinga's theory of knowledge and I think he's right here.

There are many theories of knowledge, rationality and justification out there. You think Plantinga's is too permissive. Others are too restrictive (strong foundationalism being a classic example). What is your theory Ennui? Are you a foundationalist and if so what are your criteria of proper basicality?

Randal,

sorcerer's last 2-part post brings to my mind three questions that I'm curious to ask you. These questions are simply thought experiments, but their basic premise goes completely against what all readers of your blog know you to believe. Your willingness to answer them should not (and will not, by me at least) be taken as an admission that those beliefs have changed in any way.

Imagine that God does not exist. Whatever beliefs and theories you currently hold that make this seem impossible, imagine that they are wrong. Imagine that real truth is that the universe, blindly and without purpose, bangs and crunches and bangs again, and in the course of that, blindly and without purpose forms stars and planets, and that sometimes on those planets intelligent life evolves, also blindly and without purpose.

1) Is the premise of these questions even _possible_? To what degree (more or less possible than, say, solipsism)? (I'm not saying likely, plausible, or even believable to you – just _possible_.) (If not, the other two questions are moot.)

2) Is it possible that belief in god(s) is one of those not-true beliefs sorcerer described that was evolutionarily beneficial to man at an early stage of his evolution and that it has persisted to this day?

3) If God truly does not exist, would you want to believe that? Or would you rather continue believing in a non-existent god? Why?

I'm very curious.

(part 1)

Rauser - You minimally need a designer who designed one's cognitive faculties to be truth aimed and atheism doesn't have that.

And that's just wrong. I address that in detail here: http://ingles.homeunix.net/rants/athesism/rational.html Some excerpts:

It's critical to the argument that it be more likely, or at least as likely, that a false belief will be at least as useful as a true one... The more accurate a map is, the more likely it is to be useful. A map of New York's subway system will usually be quite abstract and hide a lot of detail - but the details it does show had best be correct. For example, it might not be accurate as to scale, and not show the true distances between the stops, but for many purposes this isn't important. Now, if it shows a nonexistent stop - or hides an existing one - by that very fact it becomes dramatically less useful than an accurate map for the purpose of navigating around New York by subway. By the same token, the more accurate our mental "maps" of the universe around us are, the more likely they are to be useful. And that does have evolutionary consequences. We would expect that, at least for the envi
ronments we've evolved for, our mental maps would tend to be pretty useful... and accuracy and usefulness are strongly correlated.

Moreover, you can easily imagine arbitrarily complex chains of 'false beliefs that have useful consequences', such as the fancies Plantinga describes above, but evolution must economize. Resources are finite and the more complex the system the harder and more expensive it is to develop (and the more ways development can go wrong). It's worth noting that the examples Plantinga comes up with are all overly complex and Rube-Goldberg-esqe; certainly evolution
does produce such structures but also boasts examples of efficiency that far outstrip that of most of the machines we can produce.

The second problem (at least, for a theist) with the EAAN is that it's actually true - so far as it really goes... [I]f a belief is useful (at least in the typical environment an organism encounters), it will be selected for regardless of its accuracy. As we've established, accurate ideas are more likely to be useful than false ones, but by no means is that a guarantee. Another science fiction author, Robert Heinlein, put this well: "Delusions are often functional. A mother's opinions about her children's beauty, intelligence, goodness, et cetera ad nauseam, keep her from drowning them at birth."

(part 2)

We have plenty of examples of 'naturally warped' thinking in our own experience. For example, this strange, incomprehensible delusion - common among the majority of women - that men are somehow sexually attractive and women are not. ( :-> ) So we would expect a certain amount of irrational (or, at least, non-rational) thinking just because it's so useful in propagating the species. But that's only part of the story. The human body is a remarkable machine, but it's far f
rom perfect and has structural flaws and weaknesses. Should we expect the human mind to be dramatically different?

It takes effort for people to think logically about the world and to carefully examine it while putting aside preconceptions. And when we do, we find things
that we didn't expect - things that strike us as really weird. (I can recommend Carl Sagan's book "The Demon-Haunted World" for a discussion both of the human
tendency to fallacy and the ways to counteract it.) This is kind of a problem for the people who try to put forth this argument, if you ponder it for a
moment. They are the ones claiming that our reasoning processes are deliberately designed and fashioned by (at least) one master craftsthing, so the fact
that our thinking is so easily derailed is kind of a sticking point. By their own lights, our thinking ought to be substantially clearer and better.

Of course, the actual case is more-or-less what we'd expect from an evolutionary origin of humanity: A mind that's flexible enough to learn and correct
errors - good enough for day-to-day operations in the kind of environments we've lived in - but nevertheless prone to fallacies and illogic when tired,
excited, or careless.

There's also another consideration. Even if you consider it possible that you might be mistaken or illogical about many things, you still have to assume that
it's possible to be right at least some of the time, about some things. Otherwise you descend into solipsism.

I think Woody Allen put this in the most succinct and forceful way: "Is knowledge knowable? If not, how do we know this?"

"You minimally need a designer who designed one's cognitive faculties to be truth aimed and atheism doesn't have that. (Darwinism is aimed at adaptation, not truth, and we have no way of knowing that the most adaptive beliefs are also the most true ones. Indeed, we know that often they are not, meaning that evolution left blind would self-select for people less than optimally directed at truth."

I believe someone already countered this argument previously in these forums for truth being evolutionary beneficial so I will not repeat it.`Besides it is irrelevant to what I'm trying to say. Either way I did not argue for naturalism and the only claim is that I do not believe in the Christian God and don't believe he talks to me.

Keith DeRose's argument voodoo is equally properly basic as a Christian God using Plantinga's reasoning and, indeed, MANY irrational things can be defended as rational. Therefore this particular argument that Plantinga uses (and you have been repeating these last few posts) is a poor argument that Christianity is rational. When you say:

"Utterly false. Read Plantinga's trilogy on warrant. "Warrant and Proper Function" has his argument against the rationality of atheism."

This is unrelated to the point . Even if true, this isn't even relevant for DeRose's point to stand. He points out that voodoo, the Great Pumpkin Head, and other irrational claims don't have to be rational and can still pass Plantinga's defense strategy as being properly basic. Indeed, if they aren't rational and can still pass Plantinga's defense strategy, it shows how much weaker the argument for God being property basic really is!

sorceror,

We've been down this road already. I recommend that you read contemporary epistemologists rather than Wikipedia to find out how the concept of proper basicality is understood. I have already listed a number in this blog that will be helpful to you.

Ennui,

"Are you saying that anything anyone believes is properly basic...?"

Of course not. How could you possibly have thought that?

I'm familiar with Keith DeRose (a fine Christian philosopher).

You conclude: "Or basically the Plantinga defense can be used to justify belief in anything as rational and properly basic, including God, voodoo, atheism, or a great pumpkin monster."

Utterly false. Read Plantinga's trilogy on warrant. "Warrant and Proper Function" has his argument against the rationality of atheism. You minimally need a designer who designed one's cognitive faculties to be truth aimed and atheism doesn't have that. (Darwinism is aimed at adaptation, not truth, and we have no way of knowing that the most adaptive beliefs are also the most true ones. Indeed, we know that often they are not, meaning that evolution left blind would self-select for people less than optimally directed at truth. But how much less? Since we only have our cognitive faculties to reason with, we can never get out of this fish bowl. In other words: naturalism is in big trouble.

Rauser - If a person can have the properly basic belief that a Red Delicious apple is sitting on the counter in front of him, why can't he have the properly basic belief that the Christian God is speaking to him?

Whoa. Back way up. "Basic beleifs" according to wikipedia (and how I've been understanding it ere now) "are the axioms of a belief system". And "properly basic [beliefs] do not depend for their justification on other beliefs".

Who has "There is a Red Delicious apple sitting on the counter in front of me" as an axiom of their belief system? They might believe that their senses are accurate, and therefore there's an apple... but that's not an axiom. It's way downstream of the source.

RD Rauser states - "Why not? If a person can have the properly basic belief that a Red Delicious apple is sitting on the counter in front of him, why can't he have the properly basic belief that the Christian God is speaking to him?"

Are you saying that anything anyone believes is properly basic (because there are obviously people out there who don’t believe a Christian God is speaking to them)? If so, what is the point of even labeling such beliefs if every belief can, therefore, be justified as rational? Do I have a properly basic belief that a Christian God does not exist and has never talked to me?

Before you start talking about how belief in a Great Pumpkin is not comparable to belief in God I ask you to at least look over:

http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/voodoo.htm

In this article the author makes the argument that Plantinga was being too easy on himself when he brought up the Great Pumpkin argument and that there are people that obviously don’t belief in God. Later he quotes Plantinga when Plantinga admits as much:

“Martin doesn't tell us what he means by 'rational'....Perhaps the best candidates would be rationality as justification (deontological justification), internal rationality, and rationality in the sense of warrant. We needn't linger long over rationality as justification: obviously the voodooists could be within their intellectual rights in thinking what they do think (if only by virtue of cognitive malfunction); hence they could be justified... (p. 346)
Well, suppose we specify the argument to internal rationality; take 'rationally acceptable' to mean 'internally rational'. Then again the answer is pretty easy. A belief is internally rational if it is produced by faculties functioning properly 'downstream from experience' -- if, given your experience (including doxastic experience) at the time in question, it is compatible with proper function that you accept the belief in question. That could certainly be so for voodooists. (p. 346)

The author comes to the conclusion of the following:
“
1. There are some possible wildly bizarre/weird aberrations of irrationalism that are Plantinga-defensible (i.e., are such that Plantinga's defensive strategy against the charge of irrationality would be as successful in defense of them as it is in Plantinga's hands in defense of Christian belief).
2. Plantinga's strategy could not be used to successfully defend the wildly bizarre/weird aberrations against the charge of irrationality.
So, 3. Plantinga's defensive strategy does not provide a successful defense of Christian belief against the charge of irrationality.
“

Or basically the Plantinga defense can be used to justify belief in anything as rational and properly basic, including God, voodoo, atheism, or a great pumpkin monster.

AnAtheist.net,

I should add that most of what Christians know comes through testimony within the Christian community. Do you believe that testimony is an acceptable source of properly basic knowledge?

AnAtheist.net,

"Randal - When I type a comment addressed to you on here I usually get a response from you that intelligently addresses that comment."

I'm blushing from ear to ear. But this says nothing about whether I am real or a figment of your imagination. Both explain the data PERFECTLY.

"So, what is the most reasonable explanation? If I see an apple on a table then, unless I have a particular reason to think otherwise, then it would seem to me that the most reasonable explanation would be because there is an apple on the table. If nothing leads me to believe otherwise, then why should I believe otherwise?"

You should qualify "SEEM to see an apple."

I agree.

Your vision and other senses are also highly flawed, and skeptics throughout history have used that fact as rational grounds to doubt the deliverances of the senses.

The five year old knows nothing of how vision or the other senses work. (You and I also know little of this.) And yet we're all rational to trust them. What argument do you have that, if there is a God, he cannot grant us properly basic beliefs about him and his will in a way analogous to sense perception? You keep assuming that there is no God doing this. But you need an argument to show that an omnipotent God could not accomplish this most modest task for your argument against the reliability of properly basic beliefs about God to carry.

beetle496,

"Please back up a bit. First I think you need to address the truth of “God Exists”. You have argued that properly basic beliefs are by definition rational beliefs. But you now admit that just because a belief is properly basic, it does not necessarily follow that the belief is true."

What do you mean "admitting"? This is a mere matter of definition for those familiar with epistemology.

"I would also point out that an interventionist (personal) god is not properly basic. Neither is the god of the bible properly basic. Neither is the divinity of Jesus properly basic."

Why not? If a person can have the properly basic belief that a Red Delicious apple is sitting on the counter in front of him, why can't he have the properly basic belief that the Christian God is speaking to him?

Note that 1 ("other minds") is dependent on 2 ("external world"). If there were no external world of any kind, then there couldn't be any other minds. Can a 'properly basic' belief depend on other 'properly basic' beliefs?

In any case, just about everybody's willing to accept logic (and its child, mathematics) as 'properly basic'. Denying "other minds" or "external world" is possible, but immediately runs into practical problems. What do you do then?

"God exists" doesn't have this issue. Denying it - or just not 'rationally assenting' to it - doesn't run into any immediate logical or practical problems. Denying 2 but not 1 is not coherent, as noted above. Denying 1 and 2, or even just 1 but not 2, is not practical. But it's entirely possible to have a non-theistic worldview that's both coherent and practical.

Randal - When I type a comment addressed to you on here I usually get a response from you that intelligently addresses that comment. This is powerful evidence that I am dealing with another mind. Such evidence could be multipled indefinitely. When I run full steam into a wall I will injure myself. The is powerful evidence that there is something external to my mind and independent of its desires. Such evidence could be multiplied indefinitely. Anyone who is sufficiently concsious experiences this same evidence and understands it. Now, you are right, one could imagine an unlimited number of alternative scenarios that could explain all of this evidence. The world may have popped into existence 5 seconds ago complete with memories and a psuedohistory. We can never jump outside of our experiences and find out for sure.

So, what is the most reasonable explanation? If I see an apple on a table then, unless I have a particular reason to think otherwise, then it would seem to me that the most reasonable explanation would be because there is an apple on the table. If nothing leads me to believe otherwise, then why should I believe otherwise?

However, you then jump from these direct and unambiguous sensorial experiences to vague and highly subjective "intuitions". And from the beginning I have declined to follow you there. Seeing an apple gives me good reason to suspect that there is an apple. After all, I use my vision everyday and I have come to trust and rely on it. If one afternoon I "feel" (whatever that means) suddenly that God loves me or that the Chargers will win the Super bowl then why should I give the same credance to those experiences? After all, my intuition frequently fails me. I can't understand its pyschological origins. There is nothing about your belief that God exists that I can find to be inherently rational in the same 'properly basic' manner as these other things.

> And with that we can turn to address the other remaining issue: the truth of Christian belief.

Please back up a bit. First I think you need to address the truth of “God Exists”. You have argued that properly basic beliefs are by definition rational beliefs. But you now admit that just because a belief is properly basic, it does not necessarily follow that the belief is true.

I would also point out that an interventionist (personal) god is not properly basic. Neither is the god of the bible properly basic. Neither is the divinity of Jesus properly basic. As I wrote before, it seems to me that granting “God Exists” as properly basics gets the theologist very little. I look forward to your working through this causal chain for us!

beetle496,

"It seems to me that granting “God Exists” as properly basics gets the theologist very little. It does not follow a personal god exists. It does not follow that god of the bible exists. It does not follow that Jesus was divine."

As I have said, truth does not follow from proper basicality but rationality/epistemic justification does. One of the main modern (post-Enlightenement) arguments against Christian and other religious faith is that it is irrational, irrespective of whether it is true or not. Insofar as the proper basicality of Christian belief can be defended, that charge falls. And with that we can turn to address the other remaining issue: the truth of Christian belief.

Thanks Randal, those examples are helpful.

The basic axioms of logic are part of rational intuition, so that is fine. Moral beliefs as properly basic is reasonable (except that you think they are god-given, whereas I think evolution provides a better explanation). I think we are agreed on memory beliefs as well, but that seems like an odd combination of terms to me. I have not heard of the “principle of credulity” before, and my first Google hit makes me think I must disagree. Many other beliefs, such that our universe is fundamentally Newtonian, fit in with our common everyday experiences, but they have clearly proven to be incorrect. The implication is that at least some beliefs which are properly basic are not necessary true.

For the sake of argument, I too am willing to concede the god of Einstein, a timeless deity that kicked of the Big Bang. This god could still be around, just not intervening in all the eons since.

It seems to me that granting “God Exists” as properly basics gets the theologist very little. It does not follow a personal god exists. It does not follow that god of the bible exists. It does not follow that Jesus was divine.

Are there specific aspects of god that are also properly basic? Because otherwise, it seems to me that “properly basic” still leaves “God Exists” as indistinguishable from other untestable but sincerely held beliefs such as “Fairies Exist”.

beetle496,

I know it's over-long, but for some reason my new post is not showing up. Hopefully it will show up tomorrow.

Other non-controversial examples? For whom? You? Many epistemologists (Goldman, Plantinga, Audi, Bergmann and Alston for instance) would accept memory beliefs, moral beliefs, the principle of credulity, and many other beliefs as properly basic.

If you don't accept those as properly basic then why not?

For a more rigorous example, how about "I exist"? Or the basic axioms of logic?

This thread is already overly long, so I hesitate to contribute, but Randal I am still no closer to understanding what you mean by “properly basic” than I was back in August.

Aside from (1) and (2) could we have another non-controversal example? Last time it developed that rational intuition (i.e., mathematics) is properly basic. Anything else?

AcesLucky,

I find your commentary rather strange, for you seem to assume that epistemologists -- trained philosophers who spend their careers reflecting on justification, rationality, and knowledge -- are either very stupid or maliciously attempting to obscure "the truth". I would recommend that you actually read some epistemology to discover the problems with strong foundationalism: e.g. it is self-refuting, leads to skepticism, and is arbitrary in its criteria of proper basicality. You could read Quine, Davidson, Goldman, Bergmann, Haack, Plantinga, Alston, or you could make it simpler and just read an introduction to epistemology. Audi and Lehrer both have fine introductory books on the topic.

Rauser wrote:

"The definition you cite from Wikipedia is for "modern foundationalism". Also known as "strong foundationalism" or "classical foundationalism" that theory is accepted by almost no contemporary epistemologists."

Strange; I would think it to be exceedingly important to accept, as it forces the "basic" in "properly basic" to be stubbornly true. Otherwise anyone anywhere can just make stuff up and call it properly basic, which seems to be the case here.

And so, once again, we have the introduction of a term "properly basic" whose existence has been demoted (watered down) to obscure ever finding the truth!

And given that appears to be the case, the statement "God Exists" as properly basic, yields a great big SO WHAT? Who cares if it's (watered down) properly basic if it retains no resemblance or commitment to being true?

So what does such a demoted "proper basicality" have to do with Epistemology? Properly none, as it's commitment to truth has been gutted. What does it have to do with Apologetics? Because the demoted (watered down) usage succeeds in obscuring truth, it fits perfectly well.

I am beginning to strongly conclude that the role of Apologetics is to seek "justification" by way of devising means to obscure truth. Why would it need to do that if the positions defended by Apologetics are worth defending?

Unless it is in the strong "classical" sense, proper basicality is a fraud. It is a means not to aid in discovering truth, but to obscure it.

AnAtheist.net,

You write: "You claimed in this post that (1) and (2) are believed apart from evidence. However, that is simply not true. Our experiences ARE evidence for both (1) and (2). They may not be definitive evidence, but they are persausive and intuitive evidence."

Everything you say really comes down to the notion of "intuitive" evidence". In other words, it is intuitive for people to believe there is an external world. I believe this is correct. But then you fail to analyze the belief properly. It is not that we have some "evidence" and then infer that an external world to which it corresponds (or other minds in the case of solipsism) is the best explanation. Rather, we simply find ourselves believing that there is an external world in the most natural, pre-discursive way. In other words, it is properly basic.

If you reason discursively to the existence of an external world then trust me, you are unique (and, I must say, a bit strange).

So AnAtheist.net, let's analyze this notion of persuasiveness or intuitiveness. Isn't it possible that people might have other intuitive beliefs that they accept in a properly basic way which (gasp) are different from the set of beliefs that YOU happen to find persuasive and intuitive? I know that may be a shock given that YOU are apparently the standard of the rational, critical renaissance man, but let's consider this thought experiment for a minute. Isn't that possible?

Randal - I am not ignoring the argument. You claimed in this post that (1) and (2) are believed apart from evidence. However, that is simply not true. Our experiences ARE evidence for both (1) and (2). They may not be definitive evidence, but they are persausive and intuitive evidence. Both solipsism and idealism are counter-intuitive and few people are willing to believe either of them unless it can be shown that they offer a better or more plausible explanation for said evidence. Nobody would be faulted for living his or her life as if we lived in a strictly Newtonian Universe (for example) - after all, that is what follows from our experiences. When Einstien declared the relativity of space and time he made a counter-intuitive physical claim that did not just merely explain the same evidence well but explained unknown phenomena (the bending of light near massive bodies) and made testable predictions that were later confirmed. That's how you get people to take your claim seriously.

But, like I said in my comment, belief in the existence of God (3) is a belief about some entity which we have NO direct experience of or direct evidence for whatsoever. It is not in the same category as (1) or (2). Without direct experience of what seems to be an external world and other minds nobody would be proposing that an external world or external minds exist - or functioning very well for that matter. Thus, I can see why these beliefs might be considered foundational in order to discuss anything else - but not belief in God.

Whether or not my sniping was helpful (and I am prone to a snipe or two every now and then), so far as I can discern you have said nothing to make me think that my snipe is somehow inaccurate or misleading. Maybe Erithal will discover otherwise.

AcesLucky,

The definition you cite from Wikipedia is for "modern foundationalism". Also known as "strong foundationalism" or "classical foundationalism" that theory is accepted by almost no contemporary epistemologists. Most accept either a moderate form of foundationalism or a form of coherentism, with a few epistemologists seeking a middle ground (e.g. Susan Haack). As a result, that definition is irrelevant to the current discussion, unless you are able to offer a defense for it. (Epistemologists reject strong foundationalism because it is (a) too rigorous or abstemious in its criteria of proper basicality, leading to skepticism and (b) self-refuting.)

Rauser wrote:

"The obvious question: what is your criterion of properly basic belief? Is that criterion an incorrigible self evident proposition? If not, which incorrigible self-evident proposition is it derived from? If you cannot answer either of these questions then your position is self-refuting."
--RD Rauser

Beliefs are properly basic, in that they do not depend for their justification on other beliefs...
In addition...

From Wiki:

"In modern foundationalism, beliefs are held to be properly basic if they were either self-evident axiom or incorrigible.[3] One such axiom is René Descartes's axiom, Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Incorrigible (lit. uncorrectable) beliefs are those which one can believe without possibly being wrong. Notably, the evidence of the senses is not seen as properly basic because, Descartes argued, all our sensory experience could be an illusion."

Key! Beliefs which one can believe *without possibility of being wrong* !!!

This is what is missing from the examples 1, 2, and "God Exists". None are properly basic based on the modern foundationalism criterion *without possibility of being wrong.*

To wit:

1. There are minds other than my own.

One need only awaken from a dream to rediscover he is the only person alive anywhere. [Because of this, there is the possibility of being wrong!]

2. An external world exists.

Unless I can take my brain out of this vat, how will I ever know I'm not in the matrix? And yet to take my brain out of this vat, I have to first be outside of this vat. How can I ever know? [Because of this, there is the possibility of being wrong!]

3. God Exists!

As what? An all powerful, all knowing being? If god knows the future with infallible certainty, he cannot change it -- in which case he cannot be omnipotent. If god can change the future, he cannot have infallible knowledge of it prior to its actual happening -- in which case he cannot be omniscient. [Because of this contradiction in the very definition of god, there is the possibility of being wrong!]

4. "I think, therefore I am."

As a lone soul in a vat or as a creative god in a multiverse, no matter what my condition, time or place, if I am aware that I think, I cannot escape acknowledging that I exist! [In this, there is no possibility of being wrong!] THIS is a proper basicality!

...According to my humble understanding.

Erithal,

"Is moral knowledge properly basic? I'm not sure. I think that to be a properly functioning human being necessarily implies ethical development, because properly functional human beings are taught morals as part of their socialization. This socialization is relative. As for objective morality, I'm not sure it's demonstrable."

I am walking down the street and see a man furiously kicking an infant in the head as he giggles. I immediately form the belief "That man's actions are morally reprehensible." This belief is properly basic and true.

The fact that people develop morally tells nothing against the proper basicality of moral knowledge. People develop in their understanding of logic and mathematics as well.

"And we still haven't gotten to God as regards basic beliefs... I'm not sure there's any reason God should be a basic belief, given the complexities of God's non self-evident nature. You were getting there at the end of your post, though. I think we're close."

Here's the question: do you decide what is properly basic a priori or a posteriori? I don't think you have a clearly articulated conception of demonstrable which means you have as yet to work out what you believe to be properly basic and why. I take an a posteriori approach to proper basicality. If God exists then it is highly likely that he could have designed people to gain beliefs about him in a basic way analogous in its immediacy to the way we have properly basic knowledge through sense perception, proprioception, memory, rational intuition, self-identity and so on.
--

Randal,

Demonstration would be an exposition of premises, logic, evidence, and conclusions, with the goal of rooting out errors and faulty reasoning. Modern science provides a good example of what I'm looking for. As for the audience, I don't think I care to hold my personal standards to a national referendum, but I'm not sure what "peer review process" would look like short of a conversation like this. Though I am sure I'm not articulating this well. There's volumes to talk about just in terms of evidentiary standards, which is probably what you're getting at.

Randal,

"Erithal, among the things that properly functioning human beings know in a properly basic way is a healthy dose of moral knowledge."

Is moral knowledge properly basic? I'm not sure. I think that to be a properly functioning human being necessarily implies ethical development, because properly functional human beings are taught morals as part of their socialization. This socialization is relative. As for objective morality, I'm not sure it's demonstrable.

And we still haven't gotten to God as regards basic beliefs... I'm not sure there's any reason God should be a basic belief, given the complexities of God's non self-evident nature. You were getting there at the end of your post, though. I think we're close.

Erithal,

I didn't understand this: "Is the third principle demonstrable? By definition, if we demonstrate something supernatural, we expand the scope of the natural by discarding flawed beliefs about what is and is not supernatural. Then we reason out the truth by theorizing about what the evidence demonstrates."

Could you explain what you're saying here in another way?

And as for demonstration, demonstrable to whom? What if 99 of every 100 people accept the demonstration? Is it then successful? What if it is only 51 out of every 100? What are the conditions of demonstration? Given that this is a pivotal concept for your epistemology and metaphysics, I presume you have a clearly articulated notion of demonstration that you can share with us?

Randal,

By demonstrable I mean evidence that can be demonstrated or proven. I suppose this would also include self-evident items.

Is the third principle demonstrable? By definition, if we demonstrate something supernatural, we expand the scope of the natural by discarding flawed beliefs about what is and is not supernatural. Then we reason out the truth by theorizing about what the evidence demonstrates.

Erithal,

You write: "3) What you see is what you get: use only demonstrable evidence to assist your logical reasoning."

What do you mean by demonstrable? And is 3) demonstrable?

AcesLucky writes:

"Just a Note: I don't understand how any of the examples given by Randal, 1, 2, or "God Exists" are properly basic, as none of them qualify as an "uncorrectable" (incorrigible) self evident proposition. I started to mention that before but it wasn't the major point of my question so I let it slide."

The obvious question: what is your criterion of properly basic belief? Is that criterion an incorrigible self evident proposition? If not, which incorrigible self-evident proposition is it derived from? If you cannot answer either of these questions then your position is self-refuting.

Erithal writes:

"I don't think all religious impulses can be properly basic."

Correct.

Erithal then pinpoints the concern:

"If we can't appeal to second opinions and fundamental principles, how can we deny the rationality of Muslim suicide bombers? Yet, if their religious insights are properly basic, there would could be no grounds to do so! Why wouldn't we have to also accept Fred Phelps' Westburo Baptist Church's "God hates fags" as properly basic? We have to be able to draw a line somewhere or all kinds of religious lunacy become properly basic, too!”

Erithal, among the things that properly functioning human beings know in a properly basic way is a healthy dose of moral knowledge. Among those items are very general maxims like “good is to be done and evil is to be avoided.” But we also know many more substantial things as properly basic. For instance, I believe that a properly functioning human being also knows immediately that it is wrong to inflict harm on an innocent human being as a devotional act to honor a deity. Our moral knowledge of objective moral truths provides a sharp delimitation onwhat can possibly be objectively justified as an item of properly basic or non-basic belief.

As for "God hates fags", I believe that any perfect being is necessarily omnibenevolent and thus could not hate any class of people. Ergo,that vulgar epithet is necessarily false.

MGT2,

I'll be pressed to answer that kind of question in 3000 characters! It's a very good question, though, because the stakes are very high. In the case of Christian belief, we are talking about heaven or hell, or-- in the other case-- misspending our precious, finite lives. This isn't a simple either/or dilemma, either. The realm of possibility for Metaphysical truth is not limited to Christian or atheist (by which I suppose you could mean non- or anti-Christian); indeed, humanity might not have formulated a "correct" Metaphysical position yet. Part of me suspects that this is the case and the universe is stranger and more wondrous than we have any hope of comprehending. If this is the case, then the only way to be an intellectually honest atheist is to treat that belief as a hypothesis more than a dogma.

This means actively and openly seeking the truth and rejecting conclusions drawn from premises that are demonstrably false. This is the only consistent way forward. If Jesus really is Truth, then this would mean accepting Jesus-- but rationally, based on the evidence. Based on what I have seen, I am not a Christian, even though Quaker practice appeals to me. The evidence I have seen may justify a weak deism, but not monotheistic theism. Mainline moderate Christianity is even more of a stretch, and fundamentalist evangelical Christianity with full biblical literalism seems delusional. Even so, I am open to belief-- because I am not infallible.

I suppose, in this sense, I would be a weak atheist.

My premises would be:

1) False beliefs should be discarded in favor of true beliefs whenever possible.

2) Irrational beliefs should be discarded in favor of rational ones whenever possible. (Faith: this means you.)

3) What you see is what you get: use only demonstrable evidence to assist your logical reasoning.

From here, I advanced the hypothesis of atheism from the basis of scientific theories and materialism. I have not found an element of religious practice that cannot be explained from this viewpoint. I have seen no evidence for the supernatural or any evidence that is inconsistent with there being no God. I would very much like to believe, but I cannot find anything separating religious faith from delusion other than its frequency and social utility.

Make no mistake, MGT2, I dislike that conclusion, and I would welcome any fault in it you can find.

Oh, and while I'm here, http://teapotatheism.blogspot.com/2009/09/is-belief-in-god-properly-basic.html

If you were a real philosopher instead of just a theologian, you might have read a little Quine or any other half-competent coherentist and learned a thing or two about the consequences of solipsism or the consequences of idealism versus the consequences of atheism for an internally coherent epistemology.

But you're just a theologian so I'll try not to confuse you by introducing concepts to you that are taken from someone other than Plantinga.

“If there is any premise upon which the "absence of belief" stands, it would simply be the "absence of evidence" to support a belief (in a god or gods).”

So AcesLucky is saying that that the absence of evidence is evidence of absence for the atheist?

MGT2 wrote:


"Is there a premise upon which the beliefs of (or claims for) atheism stand? I cannot imagine there isn't, so here is my question to you. How can you be sure that that premise is not false and that your claims or beliefs for atheism are not irrational?"

Atheism is not a belief; it is the lack (or absence) of a belief (in a god or gods).

If there is any premise upon which the "absence of belief" stands, it would simply be the "absence of evidence" to support a belief (in a god or gods).

This is why the atheist puts the burden of proof on the person making the claim. If I say The Great Green Leprechaun made the world with his Great Green Hat, you'd be within your rights to say "where's the evidence" because I am the one making the claim. And I hardly think you would buy for one second that such a claim, being the foundation of subsequent beliefs based on that claim would matter if I called them "properly basic".

Just a Note: I don't understand how any of the examples given by Randal, 1, 2, or "God Exists" are properly basic, as none of them qualify as an "uncorrectable" (incorrigible) self evident proposition. I started to mention that before but it wasn't the major point of my question so I let it slide.

I think this properly basic stuff "might" be a justification if the premises on which certain statements are made were in fact Properly Basic. "I think, therefore I am." is properly basic. It's conclusion "am" is inescapable as a requisite for both "I" and "think." No such conclusions are requisite for statements 1, 2, or "God Exists."

Erithal

Thanks again.

Is there a premise upon which the beliefs of (or claims for) atheism stand? I cannot imagine there isn’t, so here is my question to you. How can you be sure that that premise is not false and that your claims or beliefs for atheism are not irrational?

@MGT2,

Then Christian faith would be justified, but not rational.

@Paracletus,

You raise interesting points. As per your way of looking at it, I don't think all religious impulses can be properly basic. If we can't appeal to second opinions and fundamental principles, how can we deny the rationality of Muslim suicide bombers? Yet, if their religious insights are properly basic, there would could be no grounds to do so! Why wouldn't we have to also accept Fred Phelps' Westburo Baptist Church's "God hates fags" as properly basic? We have to be able to draw a line somewhere or all kinds of religious lunacy become properly basic, too!

Randal! Help!

my last comment wasn't very well written... but it is what it is.

Hopefully it's not totally opaque.

@AcesLucky

“So, what exactly, then, is the relationship of Apologetics to Epistemology? Is it that epistemology has a commitment to truth (and thereby knowledge), while apologetics is only committed to justification (knowledge be damned)?

Right now, it seems to me that apologetics is only concerned with defending a stance without regard to whether that stance is true. Am I correct in my thinking?”

Well that would be a very unfriendly take on apologetics. I can’t imagine any apologist agreeing that he is simply trying to defend his views and doesn’t really care if they are true.

Apologetics, if it is done honestly, cares about the questions of truth and the questions of rationality. You don’t have to believe it, but I don’t see why someone can’t be intellectually and emotionally invested in a particular view and also honest about it. Hopefully the atheists here who are intellectually and emotionally invested in their view of reality are also honest.

The question of defending the rationality of belief comes up in some contexts. At the beginning of the 20th century all metaphysics (and thereby natural theology) was radically called into question. So at that time theists in philosophy weren’t really even in any position to make an argument for God. The response was “even if God exists, you have no right to believe it.” I suspect that most atheists here would admit that if there were good reasons for believing in God, they would be knowable. But there are some who do hold that God may exist and yet that fact cannot be known and so believing in God is never justified under any circumstances. So if that’s the question, some theists would want to answer that it can be, at least, rational to believe in God.

With contemporary atheists, they’re willing to hear natural theological arguments and judge their soundness. With Kantians and the logical positivists of the last century, they weren’t even asking whether there could be arguments. Somehow they knew they were impossible. So, again, that’s why questions of the rationality of belief (not just theism but all sorts of metaphysical and ethical and even scientific beliefs) became an such an important question.

@ Erithal,

Maybe I haven’t really understood your point but, assuming I have, that’s precisely why anyone would suggest that some beliefs, like one’s belief in God or the belief that Jesus loves me, are properly basic. If they are properly basic, they’re not deduced from any other premises. They are themselves, basic.

We’re not talking about an experiential knowledge, per se. A properly basic item of knowledge is not known in virtue of some other thing, it’s not deduced. You know that you’re a conscious being, for example, directly. You don’t need a second opinion on the matter and there’s no sense in trying to deduce it from more fundamental premises.

So, if one did know that God existed or that Jesus loved him in a properly basic way, yes, that person would be rational.

I’m not saying that those things can be known in a properly basic way. Randal knows far more about the question, so I’ll let him continue to make the case if needs be. The other option, as he mentioned, is to get the book.

Erithal

Thanks for moving this discussion along.

You say, “Heaven help you if the premise is actually false!” And “The closer they come to proving these premises Christianity takes on faith, the more rational their position becomes.”

What if the premises are not false, but defy the Christian’s ability to prove them?

Paracletus,

If we were talking about the ramifications of natural theology on Christian doctrine, I believe that examples of rationality are abundant. Given the Holy Trinity, a belief in the bible as revelation, and God's continuing presence in the world, Christianity is a rational position. Christian theology has a great deal to say to a believer about how to rationally proceed from his beliefs.

When we are talking about a personal relationship with Christ through prayer, as in Albert's case from Randal's earlier example, I have no doubt that Albert's belief is genuine. The experience is very real for him, it follows rationally from his belief in the Trinity, through the revelations in the bible, to his relationship with God. When Albert says, "Jesus loves me," the experience is very real-- but is it rational? Not necessarily.

The problem is that, in general, a philosophy based on rational conclusions drawn from false premises can't be considered wholly rational because accepting a questionable premise would be a leap of faith. The bigger the uncertainty regarding the premise, the larger the leap is, and the more irrationality creeps into the philosophy. Heaven help you if the premise is actually false!

In this sense, Christian thinkers like Randal are very important. The closer they come to proving these premises Christianity takes on faith, the more rational their position becomes.

paracletus,


That makes perfectly good sense, and I appreciate the fact that you didn't "side-step" or dance around the explanation or change the subject. That was clear and direct. Thank you.

(I've been left hanging quite a bit, but I also understand that Mr. Rauser is trying to field a dozen challenges at once; but when he does respond the answers are usually slight changes to the subject (side-steps) or only answering the part of the question that is least significant to why the question was asked!)

My I pursue your response one step further? You mentioned, "So even if we can't always have true beliefs (and as far as I can tell, we can't) we'd at least like to have rational beliefs."

I very much agree.

So, what exactly, then, is the relationship of Apologetics to Epistemology? Is it that epistemology has a commitment to truth (and thereby knowledge), while apologetics is only committed to justification (knowledge be damned)?

Right now, it seems to me that apologetics is only concerned with defending a stance without regard to whether that stance is true. Am I correct in my thinking?

AcesLucky,

I’ll add one more thing… maybe I’m not really adding anything but perhaps this will make it clearer.

There are two sorts of challenges that theists are responding to: metaphysical and epistemological, so to speak.

The metaphysical challenge is “Prove to me God exists. I’ll believe it when you prove it.” That’s a call to natural theology.

The epistemological challenge is “If you can’t prove it to me, you have no right to believe it either.” This can be taken as another call to natural theology but, on the other hand, the theist might just decline to play that game and point out that rationality does not depend on my ability to prove every belief I possess to the satisfaction of every curious party.

So even if we can’t always have true beliefs (and as far as I can tell, we can’t) we’d at least like to have rational beliefs.

@acesLucky

“Please, for a moment, explain why ‘Proper basicality’ has any significance whatsoever if it does not entail truth?”

Because an individual who believes something on account of its proper basicality is, at least, rational. Epistemology is largely about the rationality of beliefs and knowledge claims. Sometimes the epistemologist is in no position to say whether some proposition is true, but she can say whether the person who believes it has the rational right to do so.

This is not an argument of natural theology but a point about how a person can be within their epistemic rights in holding a particular belief in spite of the demands of radical evidentialism.

Randal,

“If you want my account read the academic monograph I published on the topic with Oxford University Press.”

I’m embarrassed to say that I wasn’t familiar with your “Theology in Search of Foundations.” Just skimming it on Amazon, I’m excited to go out and find a copy. I have made use of some of your published articles on the Trinity (which I’m writing on right now) and that’s how I found you/your blog.

My work right now is on the metaphysics of the Trinity but I'm sure the work you've done on the Trinity and epistemology should be very helpful to me... so thanks for mentioning the monograph.

I just watched a show on psychics and I got to thinking.

If a person was asked if he believed in psychic powers, and he said, "No, I've never seen the slightest evidence that anyone, ever has had psychic powers. Is it possible? In the strictest sense of the word possible, yes. Do I know that psychic powers don't exist? No. It's simple to produce evidence to change my mind, but I have seen no evidence to suggest that there are true psychics -- and I've looked."

Is this person a believer in psychics? Obviously not. Is he a psychic-skeptic? Yes. Is he a "psychic atheist" in the sense I would use the word atheist? Yes. In the way RD would use the term? No.

What do you think, RD? Can a person be skeptical of the psychic-hypothesis with the above reasoning and avoid the wrath of RD?

Maybe if I called myself a Yahweh-skeptic because I find the Yahweh-hypothesis to be on the same level as the psychic-hypothesis and the leprechaun-hypothesis...

Are you happier if I describe myself as a Yahweh-skeptic instead of a Yahweh-atheist?

Rauser,

I asked:
"Let's suppose "God Exists" is a properly basic belief. In what way does that make it true?"

Followed by: "And if it doesn't make it "inherently" true, why is it worthy of note?"


You answered: "Proper basicality does not entail truth."


I realize you are ganged upon here, and try to answer everybody, but you have this tendency, once backed into a corner or untenable position, to move on to another subject without delay! You don't allow a conclusion that might "develope" your position by having to change it, or solidify it by a "properly logical form" of clarity (which, let's face it, would be a truly awesome defence of your position and a game-changing improvement in the field of Apologetics).

You might condider staying with a subject long enough to flesh out the problems inherent to it, thereby evolving the lines of thought on that subject.

Please, for a moment, explain why "Proper basicality" has any significance whatsoever if it does not entail truth?

What is the point of Apologetics if not to honestly determine what's true?

Note: if 'Proper basicality does not entail truth,' what is its role in Epistemology, if any, and why is it incorporated into Apologetics if not to abscure the truth?

Randal,

You said, "If one person (the atheist) claims that the metaphysical ground of everything is impersonal while another person (the theist) says the metaphysical ground is personal, then they both make claims in need of defending."

As I see it, we're not working from a blank theological slate. Metaphysics predates Christianity, and insofar as Christianity informs metaphysics it is as an example of monotheistic theism. In terms of competing with atheism, an older philosophy, Christianity needs to produce an example of theistic intervention that cannot be explained by natural philosophy or its successor, modern science. Atheism holds no such event will exist-- and thus is falsifiable. There don't need to be two separate cases, as both claims can be settled with a single piece of evidence.

Erithal writes:

"in the case of Christianity, a great deal rides on the existence of God."

I agree, though I suspect that you understate Christianity's dependence on theism.

"It is the one thing from which so much follows-- which is why I believe the evidential burden lies with theists."

I don't see the logic here. If one person (the atheist) claims that the metaphysical ground of everything is impersonal while another person (the theist) says the metaphysical ground is personal, then they both make claims in need of defending. If somebody says "I don't know" then they don't know. If they say "I don't know" and then call themselves an atheist, well that's just silly but it's a free country.

"A Christian belief structure can certainly use "God exists" as a basic belief, but if it is a false belief I fail to see the appeal of the system."

I agree. Obviously I don't believe it is false.

Randal,

As far as that goes, I think the evidence supports your proposition-- people can (and do!) build entire belief systems on questionable foundations. Indeed, the larger the edifice built on a questionable assumption, the more intellectually necessary shoring up the foundation becomes.

For example, in the case of Christianity, a great deal rides on the existence of God. It is the one thing from which so much follows-- which is why I believe the evidential burden lies with theists. A Christian belief structure can certainly use "God exists" as a basic belief, but if it is a false belief I fail to see the appeal of the system.

Erithal,

Some epistemologists believe that properly basic beliefs must be infallible. I don't. I think that the foundations are broad and include many fallible (and many false) beliefs.

samael,

"If I recall, your defense of the properly basic nature of belief is that you wake up and "feel" that God loves you."

huh? When did I say that? If you want my account read the academic monograph I published on the topic with Oxford University Press.

You don't have to argue the "finer points of solipsism". But you cannot ignore it either. Before we get to specific beliefs we need to have an understanding of basic concepts like rationality and justification and how we apply them. Most people (you too it seems, and certainly AnAtheist.net) just assume for themselves what these terms mean to suit their tastes. So who decides what the "least assumptions possible" are? (What do you even mean by possible? Rationally justified? What?)

Your reference to temporal lobes suggests you have an undercutting defeater for certain religious beliefs? Care to develop that into an actual defeater or are you going to leave it at the level of innuendo?

Randal,

I'm doing a little bit of reading as regards reformed epistemology to try and get a better hand on the concept of "properly basic." Your post: "What does it mean to say religious beliefs are properly basic?" and wikipedia are about as far as I've gotten at the moment, but both have been very helpful in giving me the framework I need to organize my thoughts. My main concern as regards "God exists" being properly basic relates back directly to human fallibility. We could be wrong about God. As for the statement of "God exists," I suppose "evidence" was the wrong word for me to use when I asked about your reasons for asserting it was a properly basic statement-- go ahead and give your explanation, Randal. I'll do my best to keep up.

I covered that in my question, RD. I am not here to argue the finer points of solipism. You apparently didn't read the part where I said, "...least assumptions possible." And once again, you have made a claim without presenting the least shred of reasonable evidence.

If I recall, your defense of the properly basic nature of belief is that you wake up and "feel" that God loves you. Do you have any actual evidence of this claim other than this? Or does it boil down to your gut feeling? Are you so egotistical to think that it is just Christians feel this? And what do you think about the God helmet, which points toward such feelings being misfirings in your temporal lobe?

samael,

So given the unqualified way you're invoking Ockham's razor, I presume that you're a solipsist. Correct? And if not, then why not?

@Erithal

Properly basic means, in short, that some ideas don't need to be justified; they are simply foundational.

RD seems to think beliefs like "God loves me" are foundational, despite that this statement both assumes God, and is based in doctrine, by which I mean that a god doesn't necessarily love you.

RD uses this fuzzy feeling he gets, along with confirmation bias and anecdotes, as evidence that a personal God exists as defined by the bible.

One wonders if he has ever head of the God helmet.

@RD
And RD, even if it were true, that the realist must concede that there are a couple things that, if defined properly, have no basis to even argue against, how does this further your point? Shouldn't Occam's razor dictate that we make the fewest assumptions possible?

AcesLucky,

Proper basicality does not entail truth.

AnAtheist.net again ignores the argument (understandable perhaps when you have no response). Thus he says "Everytime you wake up and open your eyes you see evidence of an external world." Not according to an idealist, AAN. Rather, they argue that we experience sense data and then infer a world of extended substance to go along with it. So here it is the realist who is positing something that most people take to need no defense, even though IT IS A POSITIVE CLAIM ABOUT THE WORLD.

All you have to do is say: "You're right. The realist does make an additional claim and posit something in addition to the idealist and that claim is rational or justified even though idealism fits the evidence equally well."

And if you won't say that, then why not?

Erithal asks, “Given God's existence is not self-evident, what evidence grants "God Exists" the "properly basic" quality of the other viewpoints you mentioned in the OP?”

In order to address your question I need to know how familiar you are with the terms “proper basicality” and the epistemological theory of moderate foundationalism. If you are not familiar at all, then it will require more explanation.

As for AnAtheist.net, just as he has no coherent metaphsyic, so he has no coherent epistemology, or at least none he is able to articulate for us, and so his sniping is not particularly helpful.

Randal,

Erithal asks a great question. I'd also like to know:

1. ) Given God's existence is not self-evident, what evidence grants "God Exists" "properly basic" status? And;
2. ) Let's suppose "God Exists" is a properly basic belief. In what way does that make it true?

And if it doesn't make it "inherently" true, why is it worthy of note?

AnAtheist.Net,

No offense, but I'd asked to hear Randal's reasoning, not yours.

RD - I said nothing about the proper basicality of anything. Everytime you wake up and open your eyes you see evidence of an external world. Everytime you move around and interact with the world you see evidence of the existence of other human minds. If somebody wishes to claim that these experiences (1 & 2, respectively) are the product of something other than what the plain evidence tells us they are - then that is their burden to prove. Just having another explanation that explains all the same experience as well does not make it a better or more plausible explanation. Now, I do not experience anything like the above with respect to God (3). Not even close. So if you want to claim that some entity which we have no direct experience of or direct evidence for actually exists then you have the burden of proving that.

"For a defense of the proper basicality of (3) the intrepid reader can wade through the back catalogue of this blog"

No...no, I have no desire to wade through that mess again...

Erithal,

Because someone might in an extremely vague manner that cannot be usefully distinguished from normal psychological phenomena "sense" or have a "feeling" that God exists and loves him as immediate as seeing an apple on a table. Seriously, that's his answer. There - I saved you the trouble.

Randal,

Given God's existence is not self-evident, what evidence grants "God Exists" the "properly basic" quality of the other viewpoints you mentioned in the OP?

I hope you have a very happy new year.

You remember how our Zeus conversation ended, right?

You were fine with accepting my atheism with respect to Yahweh being the perfect creator of the universe was the same as your atheism with respect to Zeus being the perfect creator of the universe.

If this ends with you being as fine with me being an atheist with regards to Yahweh as you are a skepti-chaun with respect to leprechauns, I think we'll have found a new level of understanding between us.

Oh, almost forgot:

RD, rather than saying silly things why don't you present an argument against the existence of leprechauns modeled on your argument against the existence of Zeus?

I did promise that my argument would be just as convincing as yours, right?

Happy New Year!

RD, you are totally right. Let me fix that.

RD,
Go back and read your Yahweh vs. Zeus posts (from August). I have to say I find it deeply ironic that you, a self-described theologian, are presently unable to present any case of your own against the existence of non-physical leprechauns.

I didn't appeal to an atheist for "help". Now I don't even know what you're talking about. Rather than saying silly things why don't you present an argument against the existence of God modelled on my argument against the existence of Zeus?

Anyway, I have to head out to festivities now. Happy New Year!

RD,

Go back and read your Yahweh vs. Zeus posts (from August). I have to say I find it deeply ironic that you, a self-described theologian, are presently unable to present any case of your own against the existence of non-physical leprechauns such that you need to appeal to an atheist for help.

Converse Atheist,

Go back and read my Yahweh vs. Zeus posts (from August). I have to say I find it deeply ironic that you, a self-described atheist, are presently unable to present any case of your own against the existence of God such that you need to appeal to a Christian theist for help.

You said you'd do it first and I don't know how to do it yet, so present your case against the existence of the nonphysical leprechauns -- I need to learn how to do it.

I promise, following your case, I will present a case that is just as convincing.

Converse Atheist,

So DO IT!

RD: "I would present an abductive argument not unlike the argument I gave against the existence of Zeus."

Ok, I would present an abductive argument against the existence of Yahweh not unlike the argument that you gave against the existence of Zeus.

Erithal,

I'm not saying that it is self-evident. All self-evident beliefs are properly basic, but not all properly basic beliefs are self-evident.

Converse Atheist,

I would present an abductive argument not unlike the argument I gave against the existence of Zeus.

[ X X X 2 1 ]

CA: "Please demonstrate plausible premises that provide deductive, inductive or abductive support for the conclusion 'leprechauns do not exist'."

RD: "I'll be happy to oblige..."

CA: "I think I would learn an enormous amount from your demonstration of the plausible premises that provide deductive, inductive or abductive support for the conclusion 'leprechauns do not exist'. I earnestly await your demonstration."

Randal,

I have to ask-- why is God self-evident?