As former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi's trials continue, it's enlightening to consider what is likely to be one of the centerpieces: longstanding accusations that Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood party worked with foreign terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, against the national security of Egypt.
Based on these accusations of high treason, Morsi and others could face the death penalty.
Concerning some of the more severe allegations, one of Egypt's most widely distributed and read newspapers, Al Watan, recently published what it said were recorded conversations between Morsi and Muhammad Zawahiri, Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri's brother.
In these reports, Watan repeatedly asserts that Egyptian security and intelligence agencies confirmed (or perhaps leaked out) the recordings.
Much of the substance of the alleged conversations is further corroborated by events that occurred during Morsi's one-year-rule, most of which were reported by a variety of Arabic media outlets, though not by Western media.
In what follows, I relay, summarize, and translate some of the more significant portions of the Watan reports (verbatim statements are in quotation marks). In between, I comment on various anecdotes and events – many of which were first broken on my website – that now, in light of these phone conversations, make perfect sense and independently help confirm the authenticity of the recordings.
The first recorded call between Muhammad Morsi and Muhammad Zawahiri lasted for 59 seconds. Morsi congratulated Zawahiri on his release from prison, where he had been incarcerated for jihadi/terrorist activities against Egypt, and assured him that he would not be followed or observed by any Egyptian authorities, and that he, Morsi, was planning on meeting with him soon. Prior to this first call, Refa' al-Tahtawy, then Chief of Staff, mediated and arranged matters.
The presidential palace continued to communicate regularly with Muhammad Zawahiri, and sources confirm that he was the link between the Egyptian presidency and his brother, Ayman Zawahiri, the Egyptian-born leader of Al Qaeda.
It should be noted that, once released, the previously little-known Muhammad Zawahiri did become very visible and vocal in Egypt, at times spearheading the Islamist movement.
The next recording between Morsi and Zawahiri lasted for two minutes and 56 seconds and took place one month after Morsi became president. Morsi informed Zawahiri that the Muslim Brotherhood supports the mujahidin (jihadis) and that the mujahidin should support the Brotherhood in order for them both, and the Islamist agenda, to prevail in Egypt.
This makes sense in the context that, soon after Morsi came to power, the general public did become increasingly critical of him and his policies, including the fact that he was placing only Brotherhood members in Egypt's most important posts, trying quickly to push through a pro-Islamist constitution, and, as Egyptians called it, trying in general to "Brotherhoodize" Egypt.
This second phone call being longer than the first, Zawahiri took it as an opportunity to congratulate Morsi on his recent presidential victory – which, incidentally, from the start, was portrayed by some as fraudulent – and expressed his joy that Morsi's presidency could only mean that "all secular infidels would be removed from Egypt."
Then Zawahiri told Morsi: "Rule according to the Sharia of Allah [or "Islamic law"], and we will stand next to you. Know that, from the start, there is no so-called democracy, so get rid of your opposition."
This assertion comports extremely well with his brother Ayman Zawahiri's views. A former Muslim Brotherhood member himself, some 30 years ago, the Al Qaeda leader wrote Al Hissad Al Murr ("The Bitter Harvest"), a scathing book condemning the Brotherhood for "taking advantage of the Muslim youths' fervor by … steer[ing] their onetime passionate, Islamic zeal for jihad to conferences and elections." An entire section dedicated to showing that Islamic Sharia cannot coexist with democracy even appears in Ayman Zawahiri's book (see "Sharia and Democracy," The Al Qaeda Reader, pgs. 116-136).
The call ended in agreement that Al Qaeda would support the Brotherhood, including its international branches, under the understanding that Morsi would soon implement full Sharia in Egypt. After this, Muhammad Zawahiri and Khairat al-Shater, the number-two man of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, reportedly met regularly.
It is interesting to note here that, prior to these revelations, U.S. ambassador Anne Patterson was seen visiting with Khairat al-Shater – even though he held no position in the Morsi government –and after the ousting and imprisonment of Morsi and leading Brotherhood members, Sens. John McCain and Lindsay Graham made it a point to visit the civilian Shater in his prison cell and urged the Egyptian government to release him.
The next call, recorded roughly six weeks after this last one, again revolved around the theme of solidifying common cooperation between the Egyptian presidency and the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand, and Al Qaeda and its jihadi offshoots on the other, specifically in the context of creating jihadi cells inside Egypt devoted to protecting the increasingly unpopular Brotherhood-dominated government.
As I reported back in December 2012, Egyptian media were saying that foreign jihadi fighters were appearing in large numbers – one said 3,000 fighters – especially in Sinai. And, since the overthrow of the Brotherhood and the military crackdown on its supporters, many of those detained have been exposed speaking non-Egyptian dialects of Arabic.
During this same call, Zawahiri was also critical of the Morsi government for still not applying Islamic Sharia throughout Egypt, which, as mentioned, was one of the prerequisites for Al Qaeda support.
Morsi responded by saying, "We are currently in the stage of consolidating power and need the help of all parties – and we cannot at this time apply the Iranian model or Taliban rule in Egypt; it is impossible to do so now."
In fact, while the Brotherhood has repeatedly declared its aspirations for world domination, from its origins, it has always relied on a "gradual" approach, moving only in stages, with the idea of culminating its full vision only when enough power has been consolidated.
In response, Zawahiri told Morsi that, as a show of good will, he must "at least release the mujahidin who were imprisoned during the Mubarak era as well as all Islamists, as an assurance and pact of cooperation and proof that the old page has turned to a new one."
After that call, and as confirmed by a governmental source, Morsi received a list from Zawahiri containing the names of the most dangerous terrorists in Egyptian jails, some of whom were on death row due to the enormity of their crimes.